A HERO Report

ABSTRACT

The terrain of the Indian-Pakistani border area is a study of geographic extremes. From the high peaks of the Great Himalayan Range in the north to the vast salt flats of the Rann of Kutch in the south, the terrain along the Indian-Pakistani border shows great variation in elevation, relief, and surface cover. Much of the Indian-Pakistani border terrain is not conducive to large-scale, combined arms military operations. The extensive stretches of sand dunes in the Great Indian Desert and the high-altitude glaciers of the Himalayas, although quite different in nature, present equally severe logistical and operational constraints on military forces.

The terrain data prepared for this study divides the Indian-Pakistani border into 100 regions, roughly 50 regions for each side of the border. The regions are sub-divided into 10-kilometer bands, or sectors, to a depth of 60 kilometers from the border. Each of these sectors is described by assigning relevant terrain types from a list of 17 different terrain type descriptors, based on information found in 1/250,000 scale Joint Operations Graphics. Each sector is then analyzed in terms of trafficability for four generic military units: armored, mechanized infantry (tracked), motorized infantry (wheeled), and dismounted infantry. These data may be used by analysts to reconstruct the regions, sectors and terrain types in conjunction with computerized map graphics systems.

This study describes the analytical methodology used to compile the border terrain data. Written narratives summarize the military significance of the regions, and a historical abstract provides the background of Indian-Pakistani conflicts since 1965. A set of advance rate curves for different types of military units facing different levels of opposition, derived from historical combat experience is also provided.

Those regions of the Indian-Pakistani border area that contain the most trafficable terrain are generally found between Jhelum on the north and Ganganagar on the south, where widespread areas of flat, sparsely vegetated terrain are found. This particular area of the border is bounded on the north by the mountains of Jammu and Kashmir, and on the south by the northern reaches of the Great Indian Desert. It includes terrain where the Indians and Pakistanis committed combined arms forces in the largest battles of the September 1965 and December 1971 Indian-Pakistani Wars. Numerous strategic points are found in proximity to the border in this area. These include the Pakistani city of Lahore, Pakistani lines of communication to Rawalpindi and Islamabad, and Indian lines of communication to Jammu and Kashmir, disputed territory that has been a constant source of Indian-Pakistani tension since 1947. Information derived from secondary sources on the 1965 and 1971 Indian-Pakistani Wars indicates that the area contains strong fortifications built by both countries to enhance the limited protection of the relatively open terrain.

Based on the data compiled for the terrain analysis and the historical experience of Indian-Pakistani conflict, the area between Jhelum and Ganganagar would likely be the scene of any future, large-scale Indian-Pakistani military hostilities. It should be noted, however, that restrictive terrain has not always prevented conflict between India and Pakistan and that some of the least trafficable regions in the database have been and are areas of military conflict. These include the Rann of Kutch (where surface conditions in dry weather offer almost unlimited trafficability, but where logistical support is limited by climate and sparse road networks), the Great Indian and Thar Deserts, and the Siachen Glacier in the Karakoram Range. The sensitivity of both countries to control of border territories virtually ensures that the antagonists will in the future conduct military operations at many points along the Indian-Pakistani border, should hostilities erupt.

EXAMPLES OF ANALYSIS

Country: Pakistan

Regions: Sodhra, Sialkot, and Gujranwala

Depth of Region: 60 km

Orientation at Border: NW to ESE

Probable Indian Attack Axis: NE to SW

Overview

These three regions are treated together because of their military importance as a supra-region. With the exception of a few key urban areas, the terrain is FLAT, BARE, HARD throughout the supra-region and offers an Indian attacking force numerous possibilities.

There are two natural obstacles: The Chenab River running northeast to southwest in the northern tip, and the Degh Nadi River that runs northeast to southwest in the eastern portion of the supra-region. In reality, these rivers are not major obstacles to an attacker since they flow in the direction of attack and not perpendicular to it. However, these rivers would present an obstacle to any lateral movement of forces. This could be a problem for a defender wishing to reinforce a threatened sector, or an attacker wishing to exploit a breakthrough.

The most important man-made obstacles are the canal systems that cut across the supra-region generally from north to south. These are hindrances to an attacker and are easily breached only at existing bridges, of which there are many.

The key terrain features in the region are the canals, and two population/transportation centers, the towns of Sialkot close to the border, and the two of Gujranwala in the southwest corner. Another piece of key terrain is the bridge across the Chenab River in the northern tip of the supra-region at the Marala Headqorks. This is the only area where the terrain (SWAMP, MIXED/OPEN) differs from the (FLAT, BARE, HARD) terrain elsewhere.

Observation throughout the supra-region is good, and fields of fire are excellent. The only exception to these conditions will be in and around the urban areas where fields of fire and observation inward will be degraded by the density of the structures. Conversely, cover and concealment throughout the supra-region is poor, except as can be achieved in urban areas, or behind/beneath man-made structures. The roadways along the canals, for example, will offer some concealment, and will facilitate the construction of cover.

Military Operations

An Indian attacker in this supra-region can be very well supported logistically because of the hard terrain and fairly good road net on the Indian side of the border. The likely objectives for an attacker would be:

· The bridge across the Chenab River at the Marala Headworks in the Sodhra Region to run the defender’s left flank and push southwest toward Gujranwala.

· The main road bridges across the canals in the Sialkot and Gujranwala Regions.

· The area around the town of Pasrur in the Gujranwala Region to force further canal crossings, and to assist offensive operations in the Narowal Region to the south.

While the determined attacker will have many excellent options, the most probably course of action would be to conduct a two-pronged main attack to secure the bridge over the Chenab River in the Sodhra Region and breakthrough to the southwest. One pincer thrust would come from the north and the other from the east, and then join into a single effort.

The main effort would be supported by an attack along a somewhat broad front to the southwest along the Sialkot-Gujranwala axis. The supporting attack should seize bridges and crossing sites on the canals, but initially the main effect of the supporting attack would be to mask the main attack.

A successful main attack would place Indian forces behind two of the major canals used as defensive positions by the Pakistani forces, and will permit the attacker the opportunity to either roll-up the defender’s flank, or continue the attack southwest to exploit the Pakistani rear areas.

The strategic implications of an attacker success in this supra-region are clear—getting past the town of Gujranwala allows the attacker to link up with other forces attacking west in the area around the city of Lahore, or to head toward major bridges crossing the Chenab River north of the town of Lyallpur.

Defending forces must plan a defense in depth throughout the supra-region with several main defensive belts along the canal and road nets that stretch across avenues of approach. The defender must ensure that the bridge across the Chenab River in the first sector of the Sodhra Region is not lost. It should be fortified, and prepared defensive positions should be arrayed in depth to the southwest behind the merger of the two canals in the area.

Elsewhere in the supra-region, the defender should maintain active reconnaissance forces far forward to determine where the attacker’s main effort is likely to strike, and maintain a strong armored reserve in a position to quickly react on order.

The successful defense will deny the attacker any advance on the left flank, initially give some ground in the center, but allow no penetration farther than the second major canal (about 30 kilometers into the supra-region). Defensive depth and tactical mobility are the key factors for a defender.

Historical Combat Operations

In the September 1965 Indian-Pakistani War, the Indian Army launched several secondary attacks in the supra-region aimed at breaching the Ichhogil Canal defensive line (Marala Ravi Link) and the communications center at Sialkot. Pakistani counter-attacks and the lack of decisive preponderance in combat power on either side led to a stalemated situation in which both sides achieved only limited territorial and operational gains.

In the December 1971 Indian-Pakistani War, Indian forces captured the Phuklean salient at the apex of the angle formed by the Sodhra and Sialkot Regions. These forces parachuted to the Marala Headworks on the Chenab River. The more extensive fighting in the Shakargarh bulge occurred east of the Gujranwala Region and did not penetrate the supra-region. The Pakistanis, however, had established defensive positions, including a minefield sown along the Degh Nadi Line, with which the Indians would have had to contend if they had penetrated that far.

Critical Judgment

The terrain in this supra-region, including natural and man-made obstacles, will not favor the defender unless fortifications are prepared in depth. The most positive factor for an attacker with a sufficient combat power advantage is the element of surprise, which will degrade about three days after the initial shock wears off the defender. The following table illustrates advance rate possibilities.

Defender

Attacker

Best Case

Fortifications, Obstacles and Bad Weather

Worst Case

No Fortifications, but Obstacles and Bad Weather

Best Case

3:1 Combat Power Ratio and Achieves Surprise

Advance Rate = 20 km per day; attacker seizes Pasrur, crossings on second canal line on the second day, reaches Gujranwala at end of third day.

Advance Rate = 30 km per day; attacker seizes Gujranwala during second day.

Worst Case

3:1 Combat Power Ratio and Does not Achieve Surprise

Attacker is held to daily advances of less than five kilometers per day.

Advance Rate = 18 km per day; attacker reaches Gujranwala on third day.

Country: India

Region: Ferozepur

Depth of Region: 60 km

Orientation on Border: SW to NE

Probably Pakistani Attack Axes: NW to SE, W to E

Overview

The terrain in the Ferozepur Region consists of a mix of FLAT, BARE, HARD and FLAT DESERT. In the northwest the city of Ferozepur presents an area of URBAN terrain.

There are no dominant natural obstacles in the region, although the Sutlej River, running along the Indian-Pakistani border to the northwest, would limit to some degree trafficability into that sector. Pakistani bridgeheads on the southeast bank of the river would be a natural assembly area for any attack directed on the region.

The dominant man-made features in the region are the extensive system of irrigation canals that generally run southwest to northeast. Two main canals, the Bikaner Canal Main Branch and the Rajasthan Feeder, present the most serious obstacles to movement in the region. The city of Ferozepur, its airfield, and the communications/transportation corridors running for it are the other major man-made features.

The main communications/transportation corridors are: Ferozepur to Sultanpur, running southwest to northeast; Ferozepur to Fazilka, running north east to southwest; Ferozepur to Muktsar, running north to south; and Ferozepur to Jaito Mandi, running northwest to southeast. Northwest of Ferozepur at Husainiwala is a key crossing site of the Sutlej River where a rail bridge spans the waterway.

Observation and fields of fire throughout the region range from good to excellent. Reverse slope positions on the canal embankments will provide some degree of concealment, but poor cover unless man-made fortifications are added. Throughout the remainder of the region the cover and concealment are poor.

Military Operations

The likely objective for an attacker is the city of Ferozepur, with its airfield and communications and transportation links. The most probably attacker course of action would be to execute a two-pronged attack to encircle Ferozepur and sever the major communications and transportation links in the region. One thrust of the attack would be made from the Sutlej River Bridge in the northwest to the southeast and east to bypass the city to the north. A second thrust would be made from west to east, from the Pakistani bridgeheads east of the Sutlej River, to encircle the city from the south.

To protect the right flank of this attack, additional holding attacks would be made to the south so as to pin Indian defense forces in place.

The intent of the attacker would be to continue his attack to the east, using the Sutlej River on the left to provide security on that flank, with the objective or turning northeast to Jullundur or south to isolate the Punjab border regions.

The defender has little choice but to place strong forces well forward of Ferozepur so as to protect the vital communications and transportation network. Given sufficient warning of an attack, the defender’s best course of action would be to execute a preemptive attack to either sieze or destroy the bridge northwest of and the bridgeheads west of Ferozepur. Without such a warning, the destruction of bridges over the Sutlej River by air forces would be a high priority.

In the event of an attacker breakthrough, the defender must have prepared positions in depth, covering the south bank of the Sutlej River east of Ferozepur and further to the south. Forces would seek to delay the attacker, either halting the offensive or allowing time for a counter-attack force to be assembled.

Historical Combat Operations

In the December 1971 Indian-Pakistani War, Pakistani forces reduced an Indian position west of the Sutlej River at the Husainiwala crossing site. The Indians had heavily fortified the Husainiwala position and strongly defended against the Pakistanis. However, during the battle the bridge was accidentally destroyed by artillery fire, eliminating Indian access across the Sutlej River. Cut off from support from the eastern bank of the rover (and without a means to withdraw), the Indians were overwhelmed.

Critical Judgment

The terrain in this region is generally favorable to the attacker. Advance rate possibilities are shown below.

Defender

Attacker

Best Case

Fortifications, Obstacles and Bad Weather

Worst Case

No Fortifications, but Obstacles and Bad Weather

Best Case

3:1 Combat Power Ratio and Achieves Surprise

Advance Rate = 20 km per day; attacker achieves a breakthrough and exploits Indian rear areas.

Advance Rate = 30 km per day; attacker achieves a breakthrough and exploits Indian rear areas.

Worst Case

3:1 Combat Power Ratio and Does not Achieve Surprise

Attacker is held to daily advances of less than five kilometers per day.

Advance Rate = 18 km per day; attacker advances through depth of region on fourth day.

HISTORICAL SURVEY CONCLUSION

Analysis of the Indian-Pakistani border from a topological perspective combined with military operational considerations shows a territory of great diversity in terrain. Ranging from the rugged, mountainous topography of Kashmir to the featureless, flat expanses of desert in Sind and Rajasthan, the terrain along the Indian-Pakistani border contains extremes in ground as seen from a military viewpoint.

The frequency and intensity of historical military confrontation between India and Pakistan along the western Indian border may be said to vary directly with the unsuitability of terrain for military operations, i.e., the more rugged (or barren) the terrain, the less the scope of operations and the size of military forces committed in that terrain.

Still, India and Pakistan have conducted military operations in harsh terrain such as in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965, and more recently on the Siachen Glacier. The scope of these operations, however, is necessarily restrained in large measure due to the difficulties associated with operating and supporting combat in harsh terrain.

In 1965 and again in 1971 the section of the Indian-Pakistani border where major combined arms operations occurred lay between Jhelum on the north and Ganganagar on the south. Not surprisingly, this area begins on the north at the southern end of mountainous terrain and ends on the south at the northern edge of the Great Indian Desert. Between Jhelum and Ganganagar there is a road network adequate for lateral and inter-border movement and the topography of the land is flat and open.

This is not to say that there are no restrictions on movement or that the communications and transportation network is comprehensive. Natural and man-made watercourses—the Ravi, Chenab, and Sutlej Rivers, numerous lesser streams, and irrigation canals—form major obstacles to military movement. As of 1971 at least, east-west roads end at the border and lateral communications and transportation are lacking in some areas.

Nevertheless, particularly when compared with other geographic options, this is the area of primary strategic importance, the area most conducive to large-scale operations, and the area which has witnessed the majority of the major engagements between India and Pakistan since the 1960s. The proximity of vital points like the Chenab River crossing site at Akhnur and the major urban center of Lahore certainly ensures that this part of the border would be a focal point in any future Indian-Pakistani war.

Fortifications and barriers have played key roles in defensive operations during past Indian-Pakistani conflict. In the Himalayas, fortified picket posts command surrounding terrain. In the Rann of Kutch, the Indians and Pakistanis have used the few permanently dry and elevated terrain features in a similar manner to observe and dominate the sand and mud flats of the Rann. Along canals and rivers and in river enclaves between Jhelum and Ganganagar, the belligerents have built fortifications and laid minefields to defend against offensive operations by opposing forces. In standard military fashion, therefore, the Indians and Pakistanis have integrated terrain with man-made obstacles to secure the border regions.

Examination of the desert regions along the Indian-Pakistani border highlights a final factor regarding previous Indian-Pakistani military conflict. That is the importance of adequate lines of transport and communications for attack axes during offensive operations as well as for logistical support of military units.

The ill-prepared and poorly equipped Pakistani forces that attacked Longenawala in 1971 lacked proper vehicles and adequate training. The limited road network of the desert exacerbated these problems, turning the Pakistani offensive into an embarrassing setback.

Along the length of the Indian-Pakistani border both countries have had to rely heavily on less than ideal communications and transportation networks. Defensive plans have been formulated by commanders sensitive to the vulnerability of these networks within their own borders; offensive operations have been guided not only by attack objectives but by the ability to assemble forces and support them on available lines of supply and communications.

A variety of terrain, much of it unfavorable for military maneuver, describes the Indian-Pakistani border. Along the length of the border, available logistical networks and fortifications have combined with natural terrain features to dictate the nature and scope of military operations. Major historical military operations have been conducted in regions where terrain is favorable to the employment of large forces, particularly in the border area bounded by Jhelum on the north and Ganganagar on the south. Based on past experience, it would seem likely that future military confrontation between India and Pakistan would focus on this same region as the decisive area of operations.