WEST MEETS EAST
Chinese and Western Researchers Exchange Views on the Revolution in Military Affairs
By Robert Butler, Charles Hawkins, and Timothy Thomas

Introduction

It had been 10 years since U.S. and Chinese defense researchers sat around a table discussing conventional force analysis, and opined about future military developments. The previous meetings were held in 1987 and 1988, in Beijing and Washington, and were officially sanctioned conferences, well attended by members of both government's military analytical community.1 But in 1989, events in Tiananmen Square and subsequent protests from the U.S. government lowered the curtain on such valuable exchanges.

In March 1998, the curtain was raised slightly, by sub-official means, and five Western defense analysts journeyed to Beijing to participate in the first Hua-Mei Workshop.2 The workshop was held at the China Defense Science & Technology Information Center (CDSTIC) in Beijing, and co-sponsored by U.S.-based HERO Library and CDSTIC.3 The Hua-Mei Workshop featured 11 Chinese and three U.S. presenters, each giving their views on different aspects of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).4

Here's what happened.

RMA or Military Revolution?

Although precise definitions are not necessary to discuss a topic, a general understanding is important to aid analytical exchanges. A literal translation into Chinese, revolution in military affairs becomes military revolution. Our Chinese colleagues pointed out that they have a very different interpretation of the term military revolution compared to revolution in military affairs.5

To provide clarification, they argued that RMA is a collection of systems that use machine intelligence to process information to give command, control, communications and computer systems a near-real time capability to operate, along with advances in doctrine and tactics to use these new capabilities in war.6 A military revolution, they aver, is a fundamental reordering of the military. The Chinese are exploring RMA concepts, and feel that these could lead to a military revolution in the future, but that China was not undergoing a military revolution today.7

Chinese presentations focused on the impact of RMA on China, on Chinese views of RMA in America, and on forecasts for the future.8


Impact of RMA on China and Its Military Forces

Ms. Xu Jue, a research associate at CDSTIC and formerly a member of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), provided insights on the impact of RMA on China and its neighbors. Key attributes of RMA, she said, are accuracy, the ability to detect targets, and new ways of waging war, and that these distinguishing features are a natural outcome of an information society.

From Jue's vantage point, RMA thinking has challenged traditional Chinese precepts about warfare, especially the concept of an active defense.9 She noted that this suggests several ideas for further exploration.
1. The need for an offensive RMA principle to preclude weakness.
2. Continued use of inferior weaponry will result in loss or defeat.
3. Positional warfare will be difficult against advanced technology.
4. New organizing concepts, such as the joint task force, may be needed to fully exploit RMA. For example, the PLA Army may not always be the right force to lead an operation.10
5. There will be a continuing need to push technology to further advance RMA thinking and develop appropriate doctrine.

Looking at China's neighbors, Jue noted that India's development of composite battle groups may offer a new organizing concept for the Chinese to explore. Japan's dwindling dominance in the semiconductor industry serves as an illustration of what insufficient sustainment of a key technology may cause.

Mr. Huang Haiyuang, associate fellow at CDSTIC, has been researching the development of RMA concepts since 1988. He points out that, in this century, we have moved from trench warfare to the current era via a number of technological advances, including nuclear technology, electronic technology, and aerospace technology, all examples of breakthrough technologies that have enabled RMA advances. He highlighted seven technology priorities today for China: information warfare (IW) or information operations; air and missile defense technology; precision guided munitions (PGM) technology; defensive weapon technology; unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology; military space technology; and naval carrier (air-to-ship integration) technology. To be effective, these technologies need to be integrated. However, Huang cautioned, the individual is still the key in fast-paced warfare.

When asked about military restructuring to exploit these technologies, Huang explained that the PLA was embarking on a two-phase plan. In the remainder of this century, he said, the PLA is building down into a smaller, higher quality force while it explores new concepts. In the early 21st century, the PLA will focus on high technology research and applications.11

Capt. Zhang Zhaozhong gave a paper entitled Military Revolution and Its Influence on the Development of the Navy. He emphasized how strategic U.S. thinkers, such as futurist Alvin Toffler (and his co-author wife, Heidi), Adm. William Owens (USN, ret.), and Martin Libecki (National Defense University), have influenced the PLA/Navy's thinking. His key points are that the PLA/Navy has distilled from these and other sources that information is a strategic resource, has become an economic production activity, is competitive, and must be integrated through such mediums as the Internet. The push of information technology on RMA has forced the PLA/Navy to see concepts driving platform decision (vice the other way around) and the integration of systems and service capabilities into networked warfighting structures. In this information- and system-intensive environment, Capt. Zhang said, there are both advantages and disadvantages of using commercial off the shelf (COTS) technology. On the one hand, use of COTS promotes interoperability, but on the other hand, the use of COTS may make it easier for an enemy to exploit an opponent's systems.

Capt. Zhang concluded with the following thought provoking observations on the overall impact of RMA:
1. Judged from the angle of operations space, the tendency is toward the integrated fighting space of land, sea, sky and space.
2. Judged from the angle of military strength, importance is attached to joint and coordinated fighting of multiple services.
3. Judged from the angle of command style, attention is paid to information and horizontal integration.
4. Seen from the angle of operations style, attention is paid to information war and long distance precision strike war in whole depth.
5. Judged from the angle of operations effects, the emphasis is laid on paralyzed operations and information superiority.

Chinese Views on America's RMA

Mr. Wang Zhi, a senior CDSTIC researcher and former fellow at Tufts and Harvard Universities, stimulated much discussion about the implications of the American RMA. Based on his experiences in the U.S. and his analysis of open source literature, he made the following points:
1. Information technology is the key RMA driver and has natural spinoffs for the military, economic, and industrial structures of a society. Knowledge building to create a knowledge economy or knowledge society is the objective.
2. There has been an evolution from electronic warfare (EW) to command and control warfare to information warfare. Borrowing a concept from Hawkins' lecture on information warfare in March 1997, Wang suggested that knowledge warfare will be the next stage in the progression.12
3. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) launched its RMA research efforts in January 1994 and followed with the publication of key vision documents in 1996 (e.g., U.S. Air Force (USAF) Global Engagement) and 1997 (e.g., Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Joint Vision 2010). Essential elements of these vision statements are the stand-up and use of battle labs to experiment with new warfighting concepts and increased wargaming. According to Wang, the U.S. DoD plans, requirements, field tests and lab exercises, along with service plans, underscore the U.S. commitment to further RMA exploration.13
4. The American view of RMA is immature, objectives are not clear, there are differing approaches to exploring RMA concepts, and the impact of IW is difficult to quantify. Wang highlighted the different approaches cited in DoD's Quadrennial Defense Review for 1997, and the National Defense Panel's (NDP) report Transforming Defense.
5. U.S. Army assumptions about the world security environment are reasonable, Wang thinks, however, the U.S. is still to focused on finding enemies anywhere and everywhere, to include proposing China as a threat. Wang commented that the U.S. perception of China neither conforms to Chinese history nor its current strategy. In Wang's view, the real U.S. threat is competition from Japan and Europe; he commented that U.S. historians have forgotten lessons learned from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The artificial creation of enemies could lead U.S. analysis of RMA astray, Wang cautioned.14

Mr. Hu Jinsong, an associate research fellow with CDSTIC and an engineer, discussed digitization of the battlefield as one aspect of RMA. His view is that the U.S. Army is trying to answer the question, How do you maintain advantage on the battlefield in spite of large personnel reductions? Hu said that the Army War Fighter Experiments of the mid-1990s became the laboratory for answering this question. Among other things, the Army noted that information security was a large issue in digitization of the battlefield, which led to the establishment of a U.S. Army Information Protection Plan in late 1997.

A perspective of U.S. Navy RMA concepts, termed netcentric warfare, was given by Mr. Wang Hua, an associate research fellow at CDSTIC.15 He cited U.S. 7th Fleet experimentation during Information Technology-21 exercises, and noted that it would take the U.S. Navy at least 15 years to achieve full interoperability with information technology (IT) based on the lag in commercial standards implementation. In spite of this shortcoming, Wang pointed out that the U.S. Navy has been successful in optimizing information distribution through local area networks.

Forecasts for the Future

Several Chinese researchers presented their forecasts on RMA developments with a particular focus on information warfare technology and concepts. Mr. Li Deshun, military editor for Contemporary Military, characterized the 21st century as an information-based warfare period.16 He said the primary goal of information warfare would be gaining information dominance, and that there were three elements of IW that were critical: information weapons, information (battle)field, and information force. Li includes PGMs, EW, optics, computer viruses, and high-powered microwaves as IW weapons. The information field, according to Li, is the integration of all fields across the electromagnetic frequency spectrum. Regarding information force, Li said that it is described by the dynamic, stand-up of network-based organizations for fighting tomorrow's war.

Li's presentation was followed by two fascinating papers on laser weapons and high power microwave weapons.17

Ms. Zhang Yaping presented Laser Weapon and 21st Century Warfare. She outlined functions of laser weapons, attributes of laser weapon systems, progress of laser weapons (to include airborne and space-based laser (SBL) developments in the U.S.), and a discussion of the laser anti-satellite test in the U.S. in 1997. Zhang said that SBL had the potential to revolutionize warfare, and that they represented the ultimate dictum to seize the high ground.

Zhang wondered if the recent anti-satellite test might spark a race for space weapons, and cited concerns of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Arms Control Association President Spurgeon Keeny.18 The test, featuring MIRACL (Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser), was generally successful. But MIRACL failed at one point, and a low power chemical laser (LPCL) was used which also achieved satisfactory results. Zhang concluded by asking whether anyone could verify her findings and, if true, why would the higher powered MIRACL be preferred over the more efficient LPCL?19

Zhang was followed by Mr. Qin Zhiyuan, who discussed High Power Microwave (HPM) Weapons in Tomorrow's War.20 His presentation delved into HPM features and applications, to include point defense, countermeasures, suppression of enemy air defenses, and attack of enemy communications nodes and links.

Ms. Feng Yi, a senior CDSTIC researcher, spoke on Study on the New Military Revolution and the Military Information System. She described how the application of information promotes information warfare theory development, and used the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War as an example of how the U.S. use of EW, psychological operations, and deception through stealth technology contributed to the advancement of IW. She viewed the linkage of information systems and military systems as a bridge, and believes, as do most of her colleagues, the warfare will basically be the same in the next 10-15 years as it is today. Over the course of the following 15 years, Feng believes that space and electronic information will transform military warfare and will lead to the introduction of space attack and defense forces, as well as IW forces in nation's militaries. She said that IW defense will be a major goal of China, and referred to a 1995 COSTIND conference where the head of COSTIND identified IW and nuclear warfare threats as key elements to counter as China moves into the 21st century.

Mr. Sun Yujun, an engineer and associate research fellow at CDSTIC, provided a final and valuable perspective on IW and the future. Sun defined IW as actions taken to obtain information superiority, including protecting information structures and attacking enemy information structures.21 He discussed three levels of information warfare, which are: national IW, which focuses on the information infrastructure of a country; military IW, which includes military and defense information infrastructure; and field IW, which includes command, control, communication and intelligence systems. Sun said a good way to understand these levels was to think in terms of targeting considerations. He concluded by describing critical features of IW.
1. In IW, there is no front line ; in another sense, the front line is everywhere.
2. IW should minimize personnel casualties in future war.
3. A developing country is at an advantage in IW since it is not as dependent on information infrastructure and the cost of IW can be low.
4. Defensive IW is more difficult (and expensive) than offensive IW.22

Chinese Reaction to American Presentations

Timothy Thomas' presentation on Russian lessons learned on urban warfare based on the battle of Grozny spurred Chinese interest in the use of non-lethal weapons and sensor technology. Specifically, the audience was interested in how non-lethal weapons could be used to delay or preclude enemy advances (e.g., how to make roads slippery) and how sensors could be used to rapidly identify and relay counter-fire solutions to artillery batteries. Thomas' other presentation, Virtual Peacemaking, examined ways to use information technology to resolve military conflict. He made recommendations to use IT to promote dialog between conflict parties, mediated by a third party, using virtual electronic and visual means. Thomas made a strong argument for using information technology to protect, not attack, infrastructure. There was great interest in information technology applications, including a peacekeeping concept called an electronic wallet.23

Charles Hawkins' first paper discussed the U.S. reserve component forces, and studies undertaken recently to resolve issues regarding time to train and deploy for major theater wars (MTW). He discussed some of the controversy between active and reserve components and the issues of readiness versus cost involved. His second paper, Breakpoint, showed results of historical analysis of combat data to develop an algorithm useful to terminate force-on-force combat simulations and models. During informal breakout group discussion, there were several questions relating to models and simulations, which were of great interest to several of the systems analysts present. Other questions involved the organization of U.S. divisions and the flexibility of the division commander to locate himself at different command posts, and how easily he could communicate with subordinate units and headquarters staff officers.24

Robert Butler's presentation, Leveraging Icons to Support National Security in the Information Age, described lessons learned at the U.S. DoD in information technology implementation. Chinese interest focused on how the DoD's use of IT to protect its resources and the use of networks to segregate information traffic.

Concluding Observations

CDSTIC's director for plans, Mr. Huang Weiqiang, and the other Chinese workshop participants all expressed a great interest in the worldwide revolution in military affairs. Although the Chinese have closely watched U.S. development in this area, they are observing RMA-like concepts in other countries (India, Japan) and thinking over selected concepts on their own (e.g., integration of IW into Chinese People's War doctrine and active defense strategy).25 The Chinese see information technology as a key driver of the RMA and IW as a critical element.

Some Chinese analysts assess that the U.S. sees China as a threat, but at the same time, are eager to counter this perception and work with the U.S. on common strategies for peaceful engagement and information protection. In this light, the Hua-Mei Workshop provides a valuable forum for U.S. and Chinese defense researchers to openly discuss critical, sensitive and complex issues in a non-threatening environment, and could be a useful forum for building openness and stronger ties with the Chinese defense establishment.

About the Authors

Robert Butler is a lieutenant colonel in the United States Air Force, and was then serving as a research associate and national defense fellow at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy in Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is currently working for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Charles Hawkins is a highly decorated, retired Army infantry officer who has spent the last 12 years in military analysis and operations research. He is a member of the adjunct staff of the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia, and owns the Historical Evaluation & Research Organization (HERO) Library.

Timothy Thomas (Ph.D.) is a retired Army infantry officer with a foreign area service background, specializing in Russian studies. He now works as an analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

End Notes:

1. The Sino-American Seminar on Methodologies in Defense Systems Analysis, proceedings published by CDSTIC in 1987. The Chinese delegation leader was the late Maj. Gen. Wang Shouyun, then deputy secretary general of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). The U.S. delegation leader was Mr. Walt Hollis, deputy undersecretary of the Army for operations research. Other agencies represented were (in China) the Beijing Institute of System Engineering, CDSTIC, Air Force Weapon System Analysis and Research Institute, National Defense University, Academy of Military Science, Beijing Institute of Electronic System Engineering and the North China Institute of System Engineering, and (in the U.S.) the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval War College, U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense (PA&E), U.S. Air Force Studies and Analysis, and National Defense University.

2. Hua-Mei or Chinese-American. Western participants included the authors, who each made presentations, plus non-presenters Dr. Bates Gill of the Monterey Institute for International Studies, and Mr. Peter Hediger, a political analyst for the Swiss General Staff.

3. Formerly the Intelligence Research Institute, CDSTIC is the primary information analysis organization of China’s Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. COSTIND is the chief body in the Chinese government responsible for the coordination and management of military research and development, and production of new weapons and technologies.

4. Chinese presenters included (from CDSTIC), Ms. Xu Jue, Mr. Huang Haiyuang, Mr. Wang Zhi, Mr. Li Deshun, Ms. Feng Yi, Mr. Hu Jinsong, Mr. Wang Hua, Ms. Zhang Yaping, Mr. Qin Zhiyuan, and Mr. Sun Yujun; and Captain Zhang Zhaozhong (People’s Liberation Army/Navy), of the Naval Research Institute.

5. Capt. Zhang Zhaozhong.

6. Ms. Xu Jue.

7. Nor do Chinese analysts believe that the U.S. is undergoing a military revolution, but they think that we are, somehow, managing the process of revolution in military affairs. Mr. Wang Zhi pointed to the U.S. Army’s Force XXI (which they called Corps XXI) as evidence of such management.

8. Our Chinese colleagues also used this forum as an opportunity to clarify American views on RMA.

9. A key tenet of the People’s War Theory, promulgated during the tenure of Chairman Mao Zedong, was the concept of active defense to ensure the sovereignty and security of the Chinese nation. Mr. Peter Hediger also noted that his country, Switzerland, adhered to Mao’s theory of people’s war, and wondered how a nation with fewer people than Beijing could be so close to China in military philosophy, yet so different in political ideology.

10. Ms. Jue noted the changing role of the PLA/Air Force and Navy in this discussion.

11. This accords with comments from other China observers, such as Col. Larry Wortzel, a former U.S. Army attache to Beijing. In addition to a leaner force structure, the pressure is on Chinese officers to become increasingly professional. Simply attending advanced schooling is not enough, he explained, majors and colonels have to actually pass the exams in order to be promoted.

12. Coming to Grips with Information Warfare, Beijing, March 1997. This is essentially a primer in information warfare and operations, based on analysis of historical trends and patterns and suggesting possible future developments.

13. Mr. Wang cited the following sources: USAF Scientific Advisory Board report New World Vistas; USN/USMC report Future Technologies through 2035; DoD identification of 42 advanced concept technology demonstrations; and various Army documents (Army After Next).

14. Several sources were used to buttress Wang’s assertions, including the 1996 U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute’s annual strategy conference which theme was: China, Strategic Partner or Peer Competitor?, various U.S. Navy exercises in the Pacific with simulated wargaming against China, and a recent Washington Post article that cited American military officer misperceptions about Chinese military intentions. Hawkins attended the annual strategy conference at the Army War College. It would require a highly selective interpretation of the proceedings to justify Wang’s viewpoint on this basis alone.

15. Wang Hua received a masters degree in engineering in 1997 and has been working in the Weapon System Development and Arms Control Department of CDSTIC.

16. Contemporary Military is a periodical, published for CDSTIC by the Beijing Scientific Technical and Industrial Information Service.

17. Ms. Zhang Yaping is a molecular physicist at CDSTIC.

18.Yeltsin opposed the test. Keeny said “This test is provocative, and not a good way to use dollars allocated to the military.”

19. MIRACL, according to Ms. Zhang, has an operating power of two megawatts, whereas the LPCL uses 30 or 200 watts operating power. No one present had sufficient expertise to provide an answer.

20. Qin is an engineering graduate of the National Defense Science and Technology University and an associate research fellow in CDSTIC’s High-Tech Analysis Department.

21. When asked if there was a standard or official Chinese definition on IW, our Chinese colleagues indicated that one did not yet exist. A definition that was used by some of the Chinese researchers came from Hawkins’ lecture in March 1997: "Information Warfare is a feature of military conflict where information systems are attacked or defended, directly or indirectly as a means to dominate, degrade or destroy, or protect or preserve data, knowledge, beliefs or combat power potential."

In offline discussions, Capt. Zhang Zhaozhong said that the new Ministry of Information Technology may have the charter for defining and coordinating all information operations-related activity in China. Zhang and Sun further indicated that EW is now part of China’s active defense
strategy, while IW continues to be examined. Likewise, the U.S. lagged in defining IW, which it first did officially in a secret DoD directive in late 1996. Now in the public domain, the official U.S. definition tends to change with new circumstances and organizational developments within the military.

22. This has led some Chinese analysts to consider offensive IW operations as a necessary ingredient of People’s War Theory. There was no mention of the high value, low cost aspects of passive IW operations, such as monitoring.

23. Thomas explained that the electronic wallet was an advanced, hand-held device that could be used by peacekeeping troops. When uncertain of the rules of engagement (ROE), for example, a peacekeeper could query his wallet instantaineously to obtain the ROE for the situation at hand.

24. At one level, the Chinese seem impressed with U.S. organizational and operational flexibility, but they find it difficult to comprehend in terms of their own concepts. At another level, they suspect (or want to believe) that within the range and scope of U.S. flexibility there lie the seeds for its own destruction. How can you operate that way and retain control? was one question that was asked.

25. Selected Chinese presentations turned out to be a reiteration of U.S. thinking and accomplishments. These presentations did, however, provide insight into what kind of emphasis Chinese researchers place on particular aspects of U.S. research and development.

Last modified on Monday, February 08, 1999