Combat Effectiveness: A Combination of Variables

One of Napoleon's maxims states that, "The moral is to the physical as three is to one," meaning that human behavior in combat is more important than the numbers of the combatants themselves. In On War, Clausewitz states that the fighting value of troops is a given quantity. Wrestling with the notion of quantifying human behavior--the fighting value of troops--has produced a greater understanding of the circumstances of combat.

Careful research and analysis of extensive data from nearly 400 19th and 20th century land combat engagements has shown the variables listed in Table 1 to be the most significant.

Table 1. Circumstantial Variables of Combat

* Factor values established

Those variables for which factor values have been established are marked with an asterisk. The remaining variables constitute the Combat Effectiveness Value (CEV), and are a combination of behavioral and operational variables. Some, such as Command and Control, Logistical Capability, Intelligence, and Communications, are possibly quantifiable, while others may not be. Still, it is clear the moral, or behavioral, variables, are of critical importance to the CEV of a force. Especially so, since the unquantified operational variables tend to be tied closely to human performance.

Thus, while the CEV factor is able to be quantified as an aggregate of those variables which comprise it, historical research and analysis to date has been unable to quantify the value of each component of the CEV. What the historical record does show, however, is whether or not one side or the other was favored in a particular way. That is, whether or not one side had better logistical capability, or superior training, or experience, and so forth. And, the record of historical combat shows whether a specific advantage (or disadvantage) was decisive.

Nationalities and CEVs

Further studies for the Department of Defense have shown that CEVs are related to national characteristics. The nature of this relationship is not fully known at this time, and may never be, and is the subject of continuing research. However, several emerging trends from the research are apparent: (1) CEVs are different for different nations; (2) CEVs show a remarkable consistency when compared to different conflicts in both time and space; and (3) a unit's CEV seems to be most directly influenced by senior leadership through personal presence in the front lines, discipline, courage, and aggressiveness.

An illustration of the stability of CEVs is a comparison of Israeli and Arab CEVs between the 1967 and 1973 Wars as shown in Table 2. Figures shown are the Israeli CEV compared to an Arab CEV normalized to "1."

Table 2. Israeli CEV versus Arab CEV in 1967 and 1973 Wars

Since CEVs are derived for one side and the other based on an examination of each in comparison with the other, it would not be valid historical analysis to infer an advantage (or disadvantage) for a force against one for which no historical record (or insufficient data) exists. Which is to say there is no basis for giving a US force a CEV in comparison with an Arab force, for example. Still, for those forces for which historical data exists, there is a sort of hierarchy of CEVs. In World War I and World War II the German average CEV against US and British forces was about 1.2; against the Soviets it was about 2 during World War I, and 2.5 at the beginning of World War II, and about 1.7 at the end of World War II. During World War II in the Pacific Theater of Operations, the US CEV compared to the Japanese was consistently higher, about 2.

US Marines' Combat Effectiveness

Though the database of land combat which provided the basis for this survey is rich in information regarding nineteenth and twentieth century engagements, there is a paucity of data relative to the US Marine Corps. This is not an oversight, it is just that most of the data, developed at different times and under different contracts, was largely developed for the US Army. Still, there are some US Marine Corps engagements in the database from World War I and World War II, and they show performance that conforms closely to that of the US Army.

Further, when considering the Pacific Theater during World War II and the variables that comprise the CEV, similar, if not identical, factor values must be assigned to both Marine Corps and Army units. If additional research reveals differences, it will also reveal the reasons for those differences. The differences are likely to be increases in CEV based on the positive impact of superior senior leadership, as was the case with the US Army 88th Division in Italy during World War II.

Recalling those contributions that senior leadership can make to improve a unit's CEV, it was demonstrated conclusively in a separate study that the 88th Infantry Division, a normal division with average soldiers, consistently performed better than other US divisions. The reason: senior leadership. In fact, the 88th performed so well that the Germans they opposed began referring to them as American shock troops.

There are three engagements in the database involving US Marines in World War II. They are: the Battle of Tarawa-Betio; the Battle of Iwo Jima, Mount Suribachi; and the Battle of Iwo Jima, Final Phase. In each case the Marines attacked and won, and the defenders were annihilated. In each case, that combination of behavioral and operational variables which comprise the CEV were determined to be either: comparable; not a factor; or favor the Marines.

In the Battle of Tarawa-Betio, the 2d Marine Division(-) attacked elements of the Japanese Gilbert Islands Garrison. The Marines were favored by logistics, momentum, initiative, mobility, staff planning, and maneuver. Training, experience, leadership, and morale were comparable for both sides.

In the Battle of Iwo Jima, Mount Suribachi, the 28th Marine Regiment attacked the Japanese 2d Independent Mixed Brigade. The Marines were favored by logistics, momentum, initiative, reserves, mobility, and staff planning. Training, experience, leadership, and morale were comparable for both sides.

In the Battle of Iwo Jima, Final Phase, the 3d Marine Division(+) attacked the Japanese Chichi Jima Defense Force. The Marines were favored by combat effectiveness, logistics, momentum, reserves, mobility, force preponderance, and staff planning. Training, experience, leadership, and morale were comparable for both sides.

A mission accomplishment score was determined for both sides in each engagement. This is a subjective evaluation based on a consideration of each side's: conceptual mission performance; spatial effectiveness; command and staff performance; and troop performance. In the Tarawa-Betio engagement the Marines scored 7 and the Japanese scored 4. In the Mount Suribachi engagement the Marines again scored 7 and the Japanese 4. In the Iwo Jima, Final Phase engagement, the Marines scored 8 and the Japanese 4.

Even though the morale factor exists along with other behavioral variables, for these three engagements it would be difficult to assess it as other than comparable to the Japanese, albeit for very different reasons relating primarily to national characteristics.

Summary

It is clear that the data from which this assessment is drawn is insufficient to make a strenuous argument regarding the fighting quality of troops. Yet it is equally clear that the data does not support the contention that US Marines in the Pacific were disadvantaged when compared to their Japanese opponents when any of the moral, or behavioral, factors were considered.

And if inductive reasoning provides an illustration of combat effectiveness--and the data does show that the US Army was superior in CEV to the Japanese--then it must be inferred, lacking additional evidence, that the US Marines were superior also.

Last modified on Monday, February 08, 1999