Current national military strategy (NMS) is based on three key elements: shape (the international environment), respond (to the full spectrum of crises), and prepare now (for an uncertain future). Prepare now is what concerns us in this examination. According to national security strategy (NSS), from which NMS is partly derived, prepare now "requires that we keep our forces ready for shaping and responding requirements in the near term, while at the same time evolving our unparalleled capabilities to ensure we can effectively shape and respond in the future." [Emphasis in original.]

This is a sensible approach. Because of anticipated security challenges in the 21^st century, coupled with the aging of key elements of the U.S. force structure, it will "require a fundamental transformation of our military forces. Although future threats are fluid and unpredictable, U.S. forces are likely to confront a variety of challenges across the spectrum of conflict, including efforts to deny our forces access to critical regions, urban warfare, information warfare, and attacks from chemical and biological weapons. To meet these challenges, we must transform our forces by exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs [RMA]."

Prepare now is a combination of modernization and transformation activities. As the services have recently seen, it is difficult to distinguish between the two. For the time, it should be sufficient to agree that modernization relates more to activities that are meant to sustain and improve near-term readiness, while transformation activities consider the means of maintaining readiness superiority over any conceivable opponent many years into the future. Modernization leverages transformation, and may lead to military transformation through evolution. But transformation can occur through revolutionary means as well, which is why RMA and RBA are connected to its activities in NSS.

While modernization and transformation are not opposites, the processes are viewed separately, and there is a concern that there will be competition for resources necessary to achieve the aims of each. Reconciling conflicts between modernization and transformation in order to integrate the processes into a coherent whole might be a good first principle for the prepare now strategy.

What is transformation? What does a "fundamental transformation of our military forces" mean? Webster’s Dictionary says describes transform as:

• To change the shape or appearance of. In other words, what will be the impact of transformation on equipment, force structure and doctrine?
• To change the character of. For example, what will be the implications of transformation on joint operations?
• To change the nature or function of: metamorphose. For example, how will such things as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), information and computer technology, arsenal ships, and other advanced or futuristic concepts affect military functions on the battlefield?

Most can agree that change is taking place in the spheres of military thought, equipment and organization in order to meet perceived future national security requirements. It is clear that the security environment is different from a decade or so ago. Some changes are significant, perhaps revolutionary. Some of the changes are happening rapidly, while others are proceeding more slowly. Complete agreement on the nature of the future security environment or the character of change isn’t necessary (or even desirable) to grapple with the basic issues involved.

Among these issues are:

To assess fundamental military change it is necessary to know the character and nature of the military services as they now are, and look to what it is they may become. What are the common denominators of their character and nature, of their organization, equipment and doctrine? These are the things that must change if there is to be a transformation. It may be beneficial then, to take a look at other military transformations with a view to how the current military transformation might develop.

Three important factors marked military activities during the 15^th century: the growing importance of gunpowder weapons (technology); the revival of military professionalism in Western warfare after an absence of more than a millennium (military theory); and the growing importance of infantry (organization). Gunpowder weapons would not come into their own until Gustavus Adolphus’ time a century and a half later, but by the end of the century they had become the arbiters of the battlefield. The revival of military professionalism and the ability of infantry pikemen to succeed offensively against cavalry were the result of distinct military transformations.

By 1400, it had become common practice for heavy cavalry to fight on foot. To keep pace with increasingly heavy armor, weapons had become weightier and were either used for battering (the spiked mace) and more often cutting and slicing (the glaive and halberd). Although these were fearsome weapons, gunpowder weapons were proving even more effective in penetrating armor plate. By 1500, even the most conservative knights had to admit that these weapons, in the hands of commoners, had come to dominate the battlefield. A new order had supplanted an old one. The preeminence of the aristocracy and the code of chivalry, shaken by English yeomen at Crécy and by Swiss mountaineers at Sempach, were now finished.

Interestingly, the two military systems that were most responsible for restoring the ascendancy of the infantry, were the slowest to adopt the new gunpowder weapons. These were the English, who continued to place their faith in the efficient longbow, and the Swiss, who relied primarily on their deadly pikes. The French developed the best artillery of the period, but did little to affect similar advances in small arms. The Spanish, whose infantry would later become the first to use fire and movement with arquebuses at Pavia in 1525, had the most balanced military force as the 15^th century ended.

It was the Swiss who really brought the infantry back to offensive supremacy, and their military transformation was fueled by necessity. Lacking the resources of the major powers, and with rugged mountain terrain defining their country, the Swiss had been forced to fight for their independence from the Hapsburgs with lightly armed and armored foot soldiers. In the process, they learned the value of mobility, which they achieved through lack of encumbrances, and they also rediscovered the ancient Greek concept of the massed shock of a body of pikemen charging downhill. Like the Greeks and Macedonians, the Swiss also understood that this same principle would work on level ground if the pikemen could maintain their massed formation without gaps and without faltering in the face of a cavalry charge.

To capitalize on this lesson required superb organization, tough training and harsh discipline of a sort unknown since Roman times. The rugged Swiss met these challenges and by mid-century had produced forces comparable to the Macedonian phalanxes in maneuverability, cohesiveness and shock power. By the end of the century the Swiss infantry were universally recognized as the finest force in the world. Their tactical and moral ascendancy over opponents was complete.

The Swiss disdained the use of cannon, which would eventually prove their undoing, since the massed pikemen were vulnerable to cannon and small arms fire. The Swiss seemed not to appreciate this, but in the 15^th century there was no true field artillery with the mobility, organization and fire power that Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden would introduce a hundred years hence, so their vulnerability remained moot.

At the beginning of this period only two states possessed what approximated standing armies, the English and the Ottomans. Both accomplished this by a modification of the traditional pattern of feudal levies. It was the French, however, who transformed their military to a professional, standing army and developed history’s first efficient and scientific artillery organization.

The principal war in the first half of the 15^th century in Europe was the second phase of the Hundred Year’s War, in which the English continued to seek domination over France. History remembers Agincourt (1415) as the preeminent clash of arms during this period, but it was the end of the Burgundian-Armagnac civil war in 1444 that foretold eventual French victory over the English.

So long as France was torn with anarchy, the English, with their population of 2½ million and slight tactical and technological advantage, could hope to hold their conquered territory against a French population of 15 million. But when France was united under Charles VII, this otherwise inept military thinker followed sound advice and established the basis of a disciplined standing army.

When the five-year Truce of Tours expired, a transformed French military not only had enforced internal peace and stability, but also had achieved a substantial technological and tactical superiority over the English. It took this revitalized, professional French army only four years to sweep the English completely out of France save for one tiny foothold at Calais.

The reappearance of military professionalism was felt elsewhere, one example being the resumption of theoretical studies of warfare, practically unknown since the time of the Romans. Examples of this new intellectual approach to military affairs were treatises on war and on chivalry by Christine de Pisan.

As the 15^th century closed, many changes in military affairs had become apparent. But the end of the Middle Ages was only the beginning of the transition to the Modern Era. Gunpowder weapons had made an impact on the battlefield, but arquebuses were heavy and unwieldy and difficult to fire and reload, cannon lacked mobility and were primarily siege weapons, and there was no standardization. Civilian tradesmen and guilds guarded carefully the secrets to new technology, which in any event was largely held in awe or disdain by the knights. Some transformations had occurred, but more dramatic transformations waited just beyond the next chronological threshold.

Japan has experienced several radical changes in its military forces since the 16^th century. During a century of civil war that ended in 1590 with the unification of Japan under Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Western traders brought the first guns to the island country. Japanese warriors quickly adopted muskets and cannon to use against each other, with the same culturally devastating results on the samurai as on the knights of Europe.

After Tokugawa Ieyasu crushed the last remaining opposition in 1600 at the Battle of Sekigahara, the production and use of gunpowder weapons was systematically proscribed. This led, in time, to Japan "giving up the gun," and a reversion to traditional methods of fighting. When Commodore Matthew C. Perry sailed into Tokyo Bay in 1853, Japanese cannon looked down on his ships from defense works around the harbor, but no one in the Japanese military knew how to use them. The transformation in reverse was complete.

War and conflict often fuel military transformations. The development of the atomic bomb and complimentary long-range bombers by the United States during World War II are familiar examples. The advent of jet fighters and ballistic missiles, developed by Germany during the same war, are another. Interestingly, however, in another example of the two-edged nature of military transformations, one of the most thorough and complete military revolutions occurred during a period of relative peacefulness in Japan during the latter half of the 19^th century.

Japan, it seemed, had learned a cultural lesson that was hard to swallow. Its military, which had disdained the use of guns for over two centuries, now found itself technologically outclassed by foreigners from the West. Worse, they had been forced by the threat of military power to accept an United States mission and sign trade treaties with Western nations. It was not long before idealistic samurai were advocating a return to imperial rule as a unifying force to prevent foreign domination. The Tokugawa Shogunate was overthrown, feudalism finally ended, and the Emperor Meiji brought to power.

The Meiji Restoration was a period of rapid modernization, led from the new capital of Tokyo. Education reform virtually eliminated illiteracy, a conscript army was created and the samurai-class ranking was abolished. Japan’s approach to military transformation was clearly articulated:

This prophetic statement foretold the course of change for Japan’s military. Victory over China in the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War may have been given short shrift by Western observers, but dominance over Russia in the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War signaled Japan’s emergence as a world power.

Japan’s most recent military transformation came about as a result of losing World War II. After its defeat and occupation, Japan’s military was reconstituted for home defense only and severe restrictions were placed on its use anywhere for any purpose outside the home islands. We are left to ponder what, if any, future transformations may occur in Japan as the 21^st century unfolds.

Gustavus Adolphus was not yet 17 years old when he assumed the Swedish crown in 1611, and the army he inherited was poorly equipped, poorly organized, under strength, and badly led. He set about rebuilding his army by implementing continuous training from the moment a recruit entered the ranks. Field training began occurring regularly for large and small formations. He instituted a strict disciplinary code and punishment for infractions was heavy, and Gustavus’ soldiers gained a reputation for good behavior uncommon for that time.

Gustavus completed most of the transformation of his army during the Polish Wars (1617-1629). He reorganized his forces and taught them combined arms tactics and operations (infantry, cavalry and artillery), introduced new and refined weapons (lighter muskets, a highly mobile, regimental 3-pounder gun) and standardized ammunition. The effect of his technological and tactical innovations served to greatly increase the rate of fire and the volume of fire of infantry and artillery. He required his cavalry to support the infantry, thus sacrificing their speed and momentum except for the final distance of the charge, but his combined arms tactics more than offset this lack. He also organized artillery into its own distinct branch, brought civilian artillery craftsmen into the army for better control (as he did the engineers), and adopted the 3-pounder regimental gun, which revolutionized the role of artillery. Gustavus thereby earned the sobriquet "father of modern field artillery," and of the concept of massed, mobile artillery fire support.

Most of Gustavus’ innovations were adapted from previous ones, and he was not the only one to improve the military system. But no one else so surely bridged the gap between theory and practice, between idea and implementation, than he did. In solving the problem of combined arms, he made the small-unit commander the key to combat action, perhaps his greatest legacy.

Perhaps the most cogent and insightful overview of naval transformations is John Keegan’s book The Price of Admiralty. Although it is over a decade since he has written it, The Price of Admiralty is not diminished by time or overtaken by more recent works. Keegan examines four pivotal naval events that he argues are explanatory of naval transformations.

• The Battle of Trafalgar (1805), a classic conflict between wooden ships powered by sail. Ships of the line were as mature in Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson’s time as they would ever become. The battle represents the epitome of a transformation begun years before when oar-powered galleys and boarding tactics were the norm. Yet the next transformation was just around the chronological horizon.
• The Battle of Jutland (1916), fought by steam powered dreadnoughts with armor plate. The transformation from sail to steam, and from wood to iron took less than a century, fueled as this transformation was by the advent of the Industrial Revolution. Rifled guns of increasingly large caliber replaced the smoothbore cannon of Nelson’s time. Aimed and adjusted fire of greater accuracy over longer distances supplanted the tactic of close-in broadsides raking masts and rigging (the old French tactical preference) or pounding the hull at the water line (British tactical preference). As the 20^th century opened the battleship ruled the seas, but not for very long.
• The Battle of Midway (1942), a remarkable battle dominated by air power at sea on both sides in which the aircraft carrier replaced the battleship as the preeminent naval battle platform. Yet even as the aircraft carrier was coming to dominate doctrine, organization and technology at sea, another transformation was becoming evident under the sea.
• The Battle of the Atlantic, when submarine warfare marked a major technological shift in naval operations.

These are Keegan’s naval transformation benchmarks. He concludes by iterating the arguments of surface and sub-surface sailors for their respective vessels and way of fighting. Having given fair hearing to both sides of the aircraft carrier vs. submarine debate, without equivocation, Keegan argues in favor of the future of submarines.

When President Harry S. Truman racially integrated the U.S. armed forces and the federal workplace at the stroke of a pen in 1948, he did so because it was the right thing to do. Even though he had consulted with senior military leaders about this executive action, consensus was difficult to achieve and racial integration of the active military took time.

It took even more time to racially integrate the National Guard. Sixteen years after Truman’s executive order to integrate the federal forces, Congress voted the Equal Rights Amendment. This action by representatives of the people, and not an order from the White House was required to begin making America’s National Guard units bring races together.

The racial transformation of the National Guard also took time, and it occurred during our escalating involvement in Vietnam, an event that often overshadowed racial issues at home. The fact remains that in the late 1950s and early 1960s, most National Guard units were "lily white." By the late 1960s their racial character was much closer to the corporate character of the active force.

On the heels of racial integration of the National Guard in the 1960s came Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird’s military reforms, which emphasized the role of the reserve component in deterring and fighting Soviet communism. Guard units across the board were given greater resources and more modern equipment in order to boost their readiness and their capability and capacity to fight a major war in Europe, if necessary.

Although the modern equipment was welcomed by the National Guard, the complimentary requirement to train to more rigorous readiness standards was not taken seriously at first, by either active duty trainers and mentors or by the guardsmen themselves. In time this condition began to change, and the better Guard units settled into demanding training regimes, including periodic rotations by combat battalions and brigades at the National Training Center.

Today, the National Guard and Reserve adhere to the same professional criteria as the active component. According to Samuel Huntington, these measures of professionalism are:

• Requirements for entry into the officer corps.
• The means of advancement within the officer corps.
• The character of the military educational system.
• The nature of the military staff system.
• The general esprit and competence of the officer corps.

It is not surprising then, that our European allies, envious of the lavish resources the U.S. military enjoys in comparison, would remark, "You have the first, and second best Army in the world."

It remains to be seen which, if any, of these historical models the current U.S. military transformation will follow. Perhaps it will be some combination, but surely it will be identified by its own unique characteristics. History doesn’t repeat itself, as George Santayana is often misquoted, but history does paraphrase itself.

What will this military transformation look like? What is it that we will see at some future point and exclaim, "Ah, ha! Look at this. The military has transformed." From what is known of current transformation activities, along with contemporary military events, and by comparing and contrasting those with historical example, it is possible to winnow the future possibilities.

The current transformation is not a step backward, like the Japanese transformation in the 17^th century. Neither is it a transformation to a standing army, nor to a professional one, since these are already the case. Clearly the on-going transformation has a strong technological character on many levels, despite the fact that most of the major equipment in use is at the mature end of its life cycle. In this respect there are some similarities with Gustavus Adolphus transformation of the Swedish military in the early 17^th century.

A rough nonparallel with Gustavus Adolphus is the increasing use of civilian personnel to operate or advise in the use of high technology equipment, particularly communications and computer gear. Is it possible that the future transformed force will be recognized by a higher civilian content, or the conversion of civilian specialties to military ones? A recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) report warned, "Defense’s policies on information security are outdated and incomplete … Defense personnel lack sufficient awareness and technical training. Technical solutions show promise but cannot alone provide adequate protection." Are the artillery and engineering tradesmen of the 17^th century the computer and information security specialists of today?

The active Army’s so-called "tooth-to-tail" ratio is about 1:9, that is, one combat infantryman (or armor crewman) for every nine other soldiers, arguably doing some kind of support function. If the logistics function continues increasing in importance and information warfare specialties increase likewise, then a future force’s "tooth-to-information-to-tail" ratio might be 1:5:15. For an active Army example, this would mean a force size of, say, 400,000 broken down to roughly 20,000 combat soldiers, 100,000 information specialists, and 300,000 support persons. Such a force structure change would indeed represent a transformation.

This discussion is bordering on speculation, but it is worth the risk of ridicule if it stimulates ideas, debate and analytical examination of the current process and expected end-state of military transformation.

This work was part of a project for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Other members of the research team include:

John R. Brinkerhoff

Stanley A. Horowitz, Team Leader